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ABSTRACT

Since gaining independence, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced periods of internal
conflict at higher rates than other regions. The region has also experienced protracted
economic problems. Many African countries have implemented International Monetary
Fund (IMF) programs designed to improve a state’s long-term economic viability. IMF
conditionality, however, has led to a host of problems in sub-Saharan Africa that
potentially increase the risk of experiencing internal conflict. The results of this research
demonstrate that the implementation of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
significantly increases a country’s risk of experiencing armed civil conflict. Neither the
Structural Adjustment Facility nor the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility have the
same affect, though prior conflict, higher GDPs, negative GDP growth, moderate levels
of social fractionalization, transitional regimes and the presence of enclave economies do
increase conflict risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Does International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality lead to an increased risk
of violent civil conflict in sub-Saharan African states? Since gaining independence,
many sub-Saharan African countries have experienced periods of internal conflict and
civil war at a higher rate than other regions. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute stated in its 1999 Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments
that “Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only region in which
the number of armed conflicts is on the increase” (SIPRI 1999). The disastrous effects of
these wars include economic stagnation, political instability and humanitarian crises—all
of which worsen the longer a conflict lasts.

These consequences have been well

documented, yet the international community still faces numerous challenges with regard
to resolving and preventing such conflict.

This inadequacy is due in part to an

incomplete understanding of the underlying conditions that facilitate insurgency efforts.
Thus it is necessary to examine more closely the possible roots of such conditions.
The factors contributing to civil war are complex and involve numerous variables.
Some of the more recognized factors include economic grievances, lootable resources,
regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure, geography and prior history of
conflict. The economic woes of poorer countries contribute to the onset of conflict,
largely because the foregone income of would-be insurgents is very low. Recruitment
and retention of fighters is thus much easier to maintain. The presence of an easily
exploited resource base may also be problematic if conflict participants are profiting from
these resources. The type of regime a country has is also important, as many scholars
have linked transitional governments to higher rates of internal strife. Another factor that
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has received substantial attention is population pressure. Many argue that when more
people are competing for increasingly scarce resources, civil violence is more likely to
erupt. Difficult geography, such as mountainous regions or dense forest cover, may also
facilitate insurgent efforts because they are better able to organize without detection.
Finally, a country with a prior history of internal conflict could be more likely to
experience conflict in the future, though this effect fades with time.
The role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in causing civil conflict has
received much less attention. In particular, International Monetary Fund programs such
as the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) include conditions that
are designed to improve a state’s long-term economic viability. These programs have
received substantial criticism, mainly due to the short-term shocks resulting from
requirements such as decreased social spending and currency devaluation. Few have
explored how these conditions may actually increase a country’s risk of experiencing
civil conflict. IMF conditionality may create circumstances ripe for conflict in three
ways. First, decreased social spending in sectors such as health care and education may
lead to increased grievances and more willing insurgents. In addition, IMF conditions
place severe restrictions on patronage systems, which may decrease African states’
capacity to prevent rebellion. Finally, because of reductions in military expenditures,
armed forces may not be as able to suppress internal violence when it does arise.
The goal of this project was to test the hypothesis that the implementation of the
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility, Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility or
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility increases the risk of sub-Saharan African
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countries experiencing violent civil conflict. Violent civil conflict is defined by the
Uppsala Armed Conflicts Dataset as conflict incurring more than 25 battle deaths per
year. The hypothesis was tested using the Cox variant of a discrete time, repeated events
duration model. Because internal conflict is not solely attributable to a single variable,
the model included measures of the following control variables: economic grievances, a
lootable resource base, regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure,
geography, prior conflict history and implementation of other forms of conditionality.
This paper begins with a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the causes of
civil conflict, including the control variables of economic grievances, exploitable
resources, regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure, geography and prior
conflict history. Following will be a discussion of how the primary independent variable,
IMF program implementation, may increase grievances and limit a state’s capacity to
prevent and manage armed conflict.

A description of the research design follows,

including an explanation of the methods of operationalizing the key variables and a
description of the duration model.
implications for future analysis.

The analysis concludes with the results and
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Violent civil conflicts have many consequences, all of which become
progressively worse as duration increases. In the sub-Saharan African context, this is
particularly problematic because civil wars in Africa typically last longer than those in
other regions (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). As such, the factors contributing to internal
conflict have received much international attention.

Some of the most prominent

variables include economic grievances, exploitable resources, regime type, social
fractionalization, population pressure, and prior civil conflicts. Cuts in public spending,
declining state capacity, and reduced military capability are additional important factors,
which I will link to the implementation of IMF programs.

The following review

highlights the theoretical bases of each.

Economic Grievances
Economic deprivation is a strong indicator of the onset of violent internal conflict.
Africa is characterized by exceptionally poor economic conditions, and it has also been
the region with the highest rates of internal conflict in recent history (Collier and Hoeffler
2002). What might the reasons be for this correlation? A number of dynamics contribute
to increased incidence and length of armed intrastate conflicts in poor countries. First, in
states with stronger economies the costs of war are higher, thus making prolonged
conflict unattractive. In poorly performing economies, however, mobilization of potential
insurgents is not as difficult. Mobilization is enabled when economic grievances are
high: potential rebels may have extremely limited economic opportunities, thus their
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forgone income is very low (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This dynamic is essential to the
sustenance of an insurgency—if a rebellion is unable to recruit and retain enough fighters
it will not be able to pose a significant threat to state forces. Empirical evidence supports
this hypothesis: Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbum (2004) find that overall poverty, as
measured by per capita income, is a reasonably significant indicator for the onset of civil
war.
Despite these findings, the theoretical support for economic grievance factors of
the onset of civil conflict is perhaps stronger than the actual empirical data. Studies have
demonstrated covariation among the variables, but poor economic performance is also
characteristic of many sub-Saharan African states that have not experienced violent civil
conflict. Another possible explanation of why some countries are vulnerable to civil
conflict is the availability of a lootable resource base.

Lootable Resources
Berdal and Malone (2000) write extensively on the topic of economic agendas
and civil war. They point out that war may not be simply a means to an end, as is often
thought, but it may be an end in and of itself. In states where poverty is rampant, war
may provide the opportunity for some groups to take advantage of resources to which
they may not have previously had access. The presence of lootable resources thus
becomes another major factor in the onset of civil war, as it may be more profitable to
some groups than peace.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also point out that profitable opportunities play a
major role in internal conflict. This opportunity is often marked by the existence of an
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exploitable natural resource. Murshed (2002) agrees with this analysis. He cites the
tendency for mineral-rich states such as Angola and Sierra Leone to be more vulnerable
to conflict because of the availability of capturable rents from these resources.
Leonard and Strauss (2003) refine this argument, stating that the mere existence
of exploitable natural resources is not a sufficient explanation. The authors develop the
concept of the enclave economy, in which production is geographically concentrated.
This relative isolation makes resources more lootable, thus increasing their attractiveness
to insurgents and state forces alike.
While many resource-rich African countries have seen high rates of violent
internal conflict, other resource-poor countries have also experienced civil war. One
might then conclude that other factors are at work.

Regime Type
An additional factor in predicting civil war is that of regime type. For example,
Kadera et al. (2003) model the linkages between states’ domestic political system and
conflict. Their findings suggest that initial increases in the strength of democracy are
associated with higher instances of conflict. However, as democratic systems strengthen
beyond a certain threshold the likelihood of experiencing conflict goes down. Ultimately
their findings suggest that the traditional view of democracies being more immune to
conflict only holds when the democracy is well-established and possesses a certain
amount of strength.
Hegre et al. (2001) extend this thesis and posit that civil wars are more likely in
transitional regimes. Thus, not only are established democracies more likely to avoid
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internal conflict, so are extremely repressive authoritarian states. The authors use a
multivariate analysis to demonstrate the relationship between democracy and domestic
strife. In essence they rely on the notion that intermediate regimes are partially open, but
still possess repressive characteristics. The repression leads to grievances, which then
incite groups to organize and engage in anti-government activities, which is possible
because of a certain level of openness.
These findings suggest that certain political systems may be more vulnerable to
the onset of civil violence. However, there are still many other recognized causes of civil
war. The following section will provide a brief overview of fractionalization, another of
these factors.

Social Fractionalization
The impact of ethnic divisions on civil conflict, whether based on language,
religion or other characteristics, has perhaps received the most attention from the
international community. This attention is not surprising given the atrocities associated
with ethnic conflicts in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi. The origin of such
intractable divides is often attributed to the practices of colonial powers, who often
favored certain ethnic or religious groups over others (Chazan et al 1999, Murshed 2002).
The consequences of such practices resulted in more rigid social identities than had
existed prior to colonization.

Furthermore, by encouraging these identities colonial

powers did little to foster a sense of territorial nationalism (Welsh 1996). Despite this
trend, violent ethnic and/or religious conflict is actually a rare occurrence (Brubaker and
Laitin 1998). Social identity, however, provides a rallying point—one that may assist a
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rebel movement in overcoming collective action problems (Murshed 2002).
Many scholars have noted that moderate levels of ethnic and religious
fractionalization contribute to the onset of violent civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis
2000; Murshed 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbum 2004; Fearon 2004). One would
not expect to observe high rates of conflict where fractionalization is very low or very
high for similar reasons. In especially homogenous societies, social minorities are so
small that even if identity-based grievances exist, the minorities are unlikely to possess
enough power relative to the majority in order to mount an insurgency. Likewise, in
highly diverse societies groups will face more challenges either in organizing against one
another or in uniting against a common enemy (Buhaug and Gates 2002, Murshed 2002,
Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Hegre 2004).
However, when a small number of ethnic or religious groups exist in a state, they
are more likely to be polarized against one another (Buhaug and Gates 2002, Murshed
2002). If this lower level of diversity is accompanied by noticeable inequalities between
the groups, rebel groups are able to mobilize potential fighters by exploiting such
divisions.
Despite the preceding evidence, ethnic fractionalization alone cannot explain the
onset of violent civil conflict. Many states are characterized by ethnic divisions, but
these divisions frequently do not lead to armed conflict. Grievances are often based on
scarce resources, which the following section will address.

Resource Scarcity and Population Pressures
Another prominent theory of conflict involves the conflict over scarce resources.
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Many scholars, including Fearon and Laitin (2003), argue that this conflict is driven by
large populations and is a major causal factor of civil war.
Homer-Dixon cites vast populations in developing lands as being one of the major
causes of conflict (1994). Resource depletion, land scarcity and unequal distribution are
all sources of violence. Maxwell and Reuveny (2000) elaborate on this theory, citing that
if conflict results in resource destruction, then the political system may be further
destabilized, resulting in veritable collapse.
These viewpoints may reflect a popular sentiment in the international community,
but they are not supported by the evidence. Tir & Diehl (1998) find only a modest
relationship between population growth pressures and violent conflict in general.
Furthermore, they were unable to link population growth to conflict at the nation-state
level. Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) also find only modest linkages between population
and conflict, and go on to suggest that political and economic factors may be more
important. Ridgeway and Jacques (2002) are more mistrusting of the population-conflict
link, citing that such a limited focus disguises inherent problems with unequal
distribution patterns.

Difficult Geography
The role of physical geography in conflict has received increasing attention.
Rough terrain may contribute to increased risk for civil conflict because rebels are better
able to hide their activity from government forces. Buhaug and Gates, however, find no
empirical evidence that either forest cover or mountainous regions affect the scope of
conflict, but they do not test for the possibility that these factors affect the onset of
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conflict (2002). In contrast, Fearon and Laitin find evidence that geography may have a
significant impact on facilitating insurgency (2003). However, their analysis is selfadmittedly limited. In defining difficult geography, the authors simply coded the variable
according to the existence of mountainous regions in a state. They did not account for
other impenetrable areas such as dense forest cover. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) also
examine the effects of physical geography on insurgency efforts. They find that states
with mountainous regions, but not those with dense forest cover, facilitate rebel
movements.

Prior History of Civil Conflict
Numerous scholars recognize that countries with a history of civil conflict are
more likely to experience civil conflict in the future. In 1973, Hibbs found that internal
war was significantly more likely if a country had experienced civil war in the past.
Hegre et al. advanced this argument by demonstrating that “time heals all wounds,” and
the effect of past conflicts fades as the years pass (2001, 37). Collier and Hoeffler find
repeated support for this assertion, further refining it by demonstrating that countries are
most at risk of a renewal of violence in the first five years after the previous conflict has
ended (2002, 2004). After this initial period, the risk gradually fades.
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IMF CONDITIONALITY AND ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT
The level of state capacity is very important to the prevention and management of
armed conflicts.

As Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75-76) point out, “financially,

organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more
feasible and attractive.” Other scholars support this claim, citing that weak domestic
institutional structures and state incapacity can lead to increased opportunities for
insurgents (Reynal-Querol 2002). Few have examined how IMF conditionality may
actually decrease state capacity, thus increasing a country’s risk of experiencing civil
conflict. Conditions placed on IMF loans may increase this risk through three avenues.
First, cuts in social spending and public goods may increase grievances among the
population. Second, conditions often limit the availability of patronage resources that
would otherwise appease potential insurgents. Finally, restrictions on military spending
may decrease a state’s ability to quash rebellions when they do occur. This section will
begin with a historical overview of IMF programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Following will
be a discussion of the three processes through which IMF conditionality may increase the
risk of violent civil conflict.
African leaders have historically dealt with problems of weak state capacity by
relying on patronage networks designed to appease certain segments of the population
(Herbst 1990, Riddell 1992). Patronage systems allow governments to provide a variety
of resources such as jobs, favorable import quotas and access to government contracts to
their preferred clients and supporters. This kind of state intervention led to a host of
economic problems such as currency overvaluation and distorted prices (Fearon 1988,
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Herbst 1990, Collier and Gunning 1999). The patron-client system, however, served
important functions by appeasing potentially restive populations, thereby reducing threats
to political stability (Herbst 1990).

In addition, patronage systems often provided

increased funding for the military and police (Riddell 1992). Therefore, if violence did
erupt, the military would arguably be more capable of suppressing such displays.
Nevertheless, economic problems trumped other concerns, particularly when African
countries began to face overwhelming financial crises in the early 1980s.
Africa’s economic troubles during this time can be traced to both internal and
external forces. Exogenous shocks such as the collapse of primary commodity markets
and a rise in fuel prices were intensified by domestic policies that resulted in large budget
and trade deficits (Fearon 1988, Riddell 1992). As a result of these problems, African
countries increasingly turned to IFIs such as the International Monetary Fund for
assistance. The IFIs responded with the development of structural adjustment programs.
The IMF first launched the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986. Under this
facility, low-income countries were able to borrow up to 63.5 % of their IMF quota over
three years, to be disbursed in annual installments. In exchange, these countries were
expected to develop a medium-term policy framework for overcoming balance of
payments problems (Boughton 2001). The SAF focused primarily on implementing
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies such as deficit reduction, cuts in public
spending and currency devaluation. Fiscal adjustments led to an increased focus on
unproductive spending in general, including excessive military spending (Davoodi et al
2001).
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Performance under the SAF, however, was somewhat disappointing.

Many

argued that the resources available to countries under the SAF were too small to have
much of an effect. The IMF encouraged additional bilateral assistance to supplement
SAF loans, with little success. Furthermore, IMF staff and management believed that
conditions attached to SAF programs were not strong enough to ensure that program
objectives would be achieved (Boughton 2001). As a result, the IMF reviewed the SAF
and proposed several changes.
In 1987 the IMF established the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF),
a concessional lending instrument that would be available to poor countries in addition to
the original SAF (IEO 2005).1 The ESAF greatly expanded the amount of financing
available to low-income borrowers: countries were now allowed to draw up to 250% of
their IMF quota over three years, or even up to 350% in exceptional circumstances
(Boughton 2001). The ESAF relied more heavily on structural conditions “intended to
complement and buttress macroeconomic policies, raising the likelihood that program
objectives will be attained” (Ghosh et al. 2005, 143). Structural measures included
improving the tax structure, strengthening public expenditure management, privatizing
state-owned enterprises, liberalizing trade and removing subsidies (Fearon 1988, Riddell
1990, IMF 1997, Ghosh et al. 2005).

The intended effect was to instill sound

macroeconomic policies that would both overcome immediate financial difficulties and
also ensure long-term economic sustainability (IMF 1997, Paris 2004). The expansion of
conditionality associated with the ESAF demonstrates an important characteristic of IMF
programs: they tend to impose more severe conditions as the level of assistance increases

1

SAF programs were gradually phased out after the introduction of the ESAF. All structural adjustment
financing fell under the ESAF after 1995.
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(Fearon 1988). This is most likely because states in need of more extensive financial
assistance are more readily persuaded to accept these severe conditions.
After implementation, structural adjustment programs received much criticism
because these narrowly focused and inflexible IMF policies tend to ignore the short-term
consequences of rapid liberalization (Collier and Gunning 1999). This oversight was
especially significant in relation to currency devaluation and limits on public spending.
The primary objection was that adjustment policies overlooked distributional effects and
thus widened economic inequality. Overnight increases in unemployment and sudden
price increases had particularly adverse effects on poorer segments of the population.
Furthermore, limits on public spending often resulted in decreased funding for health and
education, which dealt another blow to disadvantaged sectors of society (Fearon 1988,
Riddell 1992, Collier and Gunning 1999).

It is thus not surprising that structural

adjustment became the target of substantial criticism.
Presumably in response to growing disapproval, the IMF replaced the ESAF with
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 (IMF 2005). The PRGF
represented the IMF’s effort to broaden its focus from macroeconomic stabilization to
include growth and poverty reduction. Whereas poverty reduction had only received
fleeting attention in previous structural adjustment documents, the new PRGF-supported
programs were underscored by comprehensive country-owned poverty reduction
strategies and an emphasis on pro-poor spending. In addition, the PRGF aimed to
streamline conditionality by establishing guidelines focusing on parsimony and criticality
of conditions. Internal assessments have shown that, under the PRGF, conditionality is
used less frequently and is more focused on macroeconomic policy than on structural
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measures (IEO 2005).

IMF critics nonetheless persist, citing that the new poverty

programs are little more than a new label. The policies are still very narrowly focused,
inflexible, and have done little to actually reduce poverty (Bird 2004, Gomez and Lawson
2005, Gottschalk 2005).
In addition, IMF conditionality may increase a country’s risk of civil conflict in
several ways. First, cuts in social spending and public goods may increase grievances in
the population, therefore making insurgency more attractive. In its 2003 Economic
Report on Africa, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) stressed that a
macroeconomic program not addressing issues of social and political grievances could be
very dangerous, even in countries not affected by civil conflict. The provision of public
goods is an essential government function, and restricting this function with spending
cuts may contribute to higher levels of social unrest. For example, in 1990 the Rwandan
government devoted 5.4% of its revenue to social spending. By 1992, one year after
Rwanda implemented an IMF-led structural adjustment program, that amount had fallen
to 1.7% (WDI 2007). The root causes of the ensuing conflict and genocide in Rwanda
clearly run much deeper than decreases in social spending. It is possible, however, that
cuts in public goods helped exacerbate an already-tense situation.
Another way that IMF programs may increase the risk of conflict is by limiting
patronage resources. IMF conditionalities resulted in serious strain for patron-client
systems, which was one main goal of the policies. According to Stedman, “economic
conditionality cut at the heart of the patrimonial state” (1996, 243). Austerity measures
severely restricted state spending, which led to a marked decrease in the state’s ability to
provide side payments or other concessions to their clients. Many states were required to
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cap domestic credit expansion, limiting the flow of patronage to government officials
(Fearon 1988). Furthermore, cuts in bureaucratic jobs and a greater role for the private
sector decreased support for the political elite (Howe 2001).

These reductions in

patronage resources make the state more vulnerable to political crisis, in part because it is
much less flexible in managing grievances (Herbst 1990). Empirical evidence seems to
support this claim: Lindenberg and Devarajan (1993) found that merely participating in a
structural adjustment program increases the likelihood of regime collapse: 27% of
regimes that undertook structural adjustment collapsed during its implementation,
compared with a 9% rate of collapse among regimes that had not participated in such
programs. This seems to suggest that the resulting cuts in patronage resources may lead
to increased risk of rebellion.
Finally, reductions in military spending may decrease a state’s ability to suppress
armed uprisings when they do occur. IMF-supported programs have accounted for an
11% decrease in military spending since the end of the Cold War (Davoodi et al. 2001).
Such decreases are desirable in cases where military spending is excessive and where
regime accountability is historically low, as is the case with many African countries. In
instances such as these, increased military spending may actually lead to more violence,
particularly if government forces are the aggressors in a conflict. But if a state is
confronting a legitimate security threat, this emphasis on military cuts seems illogical.
For example, in 1987 the IMF implemented an adjustment program in Uganda.
At the time, the country had been involved in an armed civil conflict since 1981. Despite
this fact, IMF programs encouraged and succeeded in implementing cuts in military
spending: between 1989 and 1992, military spending fell from 2.6 percent to 1.6 percent
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of the gross domestic product (GDP) (SIPRI 2007). Perhaps as a result of these cuts, the
Ugandan army was not able to suppress the insurgency, and the conflict continued.
Chappell’s 1998 film “Our Friends at the Bank” documents negotiations between
Museveni and his ministers and officials representing the World Bank and IMF. One of
the most contentious points in the discussions was the inability of the government to
provide sufficient financial support for its military in order to quash the long-running
rebellion. So far their success in quashing the rebellion has been limited: the uprising
continued through 2004, and although 2005 saw few battle-related deaths, the peace
process has stumbled on several occasions (Uppsala 2006, BBC 2007). Had the Ugandan
government been allowed more funding for its military, it is possible that the conflict
would have escalated. It is also possible, however, that government forces would have
been better equipped to suppress the conflict for good.
Thus it seems that the imposition of IMF conditionalities may have consequences
beyond those popularly cited in the literature. Adjustment programs have long been
criticized for their social consequences, but their role in causing armed conflict has
received less direct attention. However, the IMF is not the only institution that imposes
conditions on lending—its sister organization, the World Bank, also uses conditionality.
Traditionally, the IMF has relied more heavily on policy reforms as a condition for
financial support. In contrast, the World Bank has focused mainly on lending for specific
projects, such as infrastructure or agricultural development (Fearon 1988). The Bank
shifted this emphasis in the early 1980s with the introduction of its own structural
adjustment programs. It began to provide balance of payments financing conditional on
policy changes and administrative reform (Fearon 1988). Despite the increasing overlap
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of Bank and IMF programs in areas such as tax policy and public administration, the two
organizations still maintained distinct areas of expertise (World Bank 2001). Under
adjustment programs, IMF conditionality largely remained focused on macroeconomic
and structural policies, while the Bank’s conditions addressed structural policies (those
that are not directly related to macroeconomic policy), social policy and institutional
reform (World Bank 2001).
Critics often maintain that IMF conditionality is more severe than that of the
World Bank. Fearon states that “[t]he IMF stabilization programmes usually compromise
the most economically essential and politically difficult reforms – devaluation, limits on
the expansion of government spending and domestic credit, subsidy removals, and
liberalized foreign-exchange allocation procedures” (1988, 125). Furthermore, a suitable
macroeconomic framework—as determined by the IMF—is often a prerequisite for
disbursement of World Bank loans (Fearon 1988, World Bank 2001). IMF conditionality
is generally seen to result in more severe political consequences, but because the World
Bank plays a significant role in areas such as bureaucratic reform and privatization—both
examples where patronage resources are traditionally available—any analysis should
control for the presence of World Bank loans.

The Bank utilizes two lending

instruments: “development policy lending” and “investment” lending. The “investment”
category includes loans for specific projects such as technical assistance or investment in
a certain sector.

“Development policy lending” includes structural adjustment and

poverty reduction support credits; these loans are generally tied to conditions related to
structural, financial sector, and social policy reform, in addition to improving public
sector resource management (World Bank 2007a).

Loans focusing on development
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policy are more relevant to this analysis since resulting policy changes would affect
larger segments of the population.
Another form of conditionality falls under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) Initiative, a program launched by the IMF and World Bank in 1996 that aims to
ensure that no country is overloaded with a debt burden it cannot manage (IMF 2007a).
In order to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, a country must demonstrate
good performance under IMF- and World Bank-led programs, in addition to
implementing further reforms such as increased social spending. Because debt relief
would ease financial obligations of governments and allow them to devote more
resources to public goods, the implementation of a HIPC program may offset some of the
negative consequences of previous adjustment policies.
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METHODS
This analysis will use the Cox variant of a discrete time repeated events duration
model, a form of event history analysis. This model examines the duration of peace, or
length of time before a country experiences conflict. It will test the hypothesis that the
implementation of an IMF program increases a country’s risk of experiencing violent
civil conflict. The model uses event history data; the country year is the unit of analysis.

Event History Analysis
Event history analysis examines the duration and timing of events. Because
timing plays a major role in political events such as civil conflict, this type of analysis is
especially desirable for political science research. However, despite the increasing focus
on processes of change in political science, empirical research still often focuses on fixed
relationships occurring at a single point in time.

Many scholars avoid this shortfall by

using time-series or panel data, but even in these cases the temporal structure of the data
is often ignored (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).
Political scientists are often “interested in knowing how the duration spent in one
social state affects the probability some entity will make a transition to another social
state” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1414). Some examples include the amount of
time a state takes to adopt a certain policy or, more relevant to this analysis, the length of
time before a country experiences military conflict. In analyses such as these the timing
of events is critical to understanding outcomes. Event history data, structured as a
longitudinal record of when certain events happen to a sample of entities, examines the
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effects of timing on outcomes (Allison 1984).
Traditional regression-based models, however, are not suitable for analyzing
event history data. Event histories generally have two features that cause significant
problems for traditional statistical models such as multivariate regression: time-varying
covariates and censoring (Allison 1984).

This analysis incorporates several control

variables that fluctuate over time, such as GDP growth and regime type. A regression
model, however, must treat all covariates as fixed. It cannot account for variation over
time in the control variables, and therefore is unable to account adequately for the effects
of timing on outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).
Another limitation of regression models is their inability to address problems of
censored cases. If this analysis were to use a standard regression to measure the amount
of time it takes a country to experience conflict (or the duration of peace), the dependent
variable might be expressed in the number of years before a country experiences armed
internal conflict. Those countries that do not experience conflict, however, present an
analytical problem. It is impossible to assign a value to these countries because it is not
known when, if ever, they will experience conflict. An alternative would be to assign the
maximum value to the dependent variable—in this case 26 years, the number covered in
the dataset. However, if these cases are included they are implicitly treated as having
experienced conflict, when in fact they have not. If they are left out of the dataset
altogether, the sample is biased because only countries prone to experiencing conflict
would be represented (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). A possible solution may be
to express the dependent variable as a dummy indicator.

This method is also

problematic, because a dummy variable would not capture the variation in time before a
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state experiences conflict (Allison 1984, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Event
history models can avoid both of these problems.
Two of the key concepts in event history or duration models are the risk set and
the hazard function. The risk set is the sample of cases that are at risk of experiencing an
event. The hazard function represents the rate at which a duration ends in a given
interval, assuming that it has not already ended prior to the start of the interval. It is
interpreted as the risk of an event occurring, providing that it has not already occurred
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In this analysis, the risk set is the sample of
countries included in the analysis, and the hazard function represents the risk that each
country has of experiencing conflict at any given time.
The data for this model are structured for a discrete-time repeated events analysis.
Discrete time data are gathered at specific intervals, in this case once a year, even though
changes may occur at any time. Because a country may experience multiple conflicts, it
is appropriate to use a repeated events model. This allows for the estimation of the
duration of peace preceding each instance of conflict, not just the first conflict episode.

Data
The forty-eight countries of sub-Saharan Africa represent the population of
possible cases. Four countries had to be excluded from the analysis due to missing data:
no data is available for Somalia’s GDP, and Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, and Sao Tomé
and Principe are all missing measures of fractionalization. Once these exclusions are
taken into account, the total number of cases becomes forty-four. Table 1 lists the
countries in the dataset, the dates of any conflict occurring in the country, IMF programs

23
Table 1. Conflict and IMF Assistance by Country
Country

Conflict Dates

IMF Programs

Total IMF Assistance
(million SDRs)*

Angola

1980 – 2002**
2004

None

0

Benin

None

SAF 1989 – 1992
ESAF 1993 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

Botswana

None

None

Burkina Faso

1987

SAF 1991 – 1994
ESAF 1993 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

146.62

Burundi

1991 – 2005

SAF 1986 – 1989
ESAF 1991 – 1994
PRGF 2004 – 2005

87.80

Cameroon

1984

ESAF 1997 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

244.36

Cape Verde

None

PRGF 2002 – 2005

8.64

Central African Republic

2001 – 2002

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1998 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2002

45.76

Chad

1980 – 1994**
1997 – 2002
2005

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1995 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

117.58

Comoros

1989
1997

SAF 1991 – 1994

2.25

Congo, Republic of

1993 – 1994
1997 – 1999
2002

ESAF 1996 – 1999
PRGF 2004 – 2005

29.62

Congo, Democratic Republic
of

1996 – 2001

SAF 1987 – 1990
PRGF 2002 – 2005

698.97

Côte d’Ivoire

2002 – 2004

ESAF 1994 – 2001
PRGF 2002 – 2005

515.88

Djibouti

1991 – 1994
1999

ESAF 1999 – 2000
PRGF 2001 – 2003

13.63

Ethiopia

1980 – 1991**
1996 – 2005

SAF 1992 – 1995
ESAF 1996 – 1999
PRGF 2001 – 2005

179.19

Gabon

None

None

The Gambia

1981

SAF 1986 – 1988
ESAF 1988 – 1991, 1998 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

50.07

Ghana

1981
1983

SAF 1987 – 1988
ESAF 1988 – 1992, 1995 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

848.07

Guinea

2000 – 2001

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1991 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

163.91

Guinea-Bissau

1998 – 1999

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1995 – 1998
PRGF 2000 – 2003

19.33

Kenya

1982

SAF 1988 – 1989
ESAF 1989 – 1994, 1996 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

423.32

111.73

0

0
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Lesotho

1998

SAF 1988 – 1991
ESAF 1991 – 1994
PRGF 2001 – 2004

53.19

Liberia

1980
1989 – 1995
2000 – 2005

None

Madagascar

None

SAF 1988 – 1989
ESAF 1989 – 1992, 1996 - 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

234.88

Malawi

None

ESAF 1995 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

136.22

Mali

1990
1994

SAF 1988 – 1990
ESAF 1992 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

220.62

Mauritania

None

SAF 1986 – 1989
ESAF 1989 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2004

153.96

Mauritius

None

None

Mozambique

1980 – 1992**

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1990 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

Namibia

None

None

Niger

1992
1994
1996 – 1997

SAF 1986 – 1988
ESAF 1988 – 1991, 1996 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

Nigeria

2004

None

Rwanda

1991 – 1994
1997 – 2002

SAF 1991 – 1994
ESAF 1998 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

74.07

Senegal

1990
1992 – 1993
1997 – 2001

SAF 1986 – 1988
ESAF 1988 – 1992, 1994 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

424.89

Seychelles

None

None

Sierra Leone

1991 – 2000

SAF 1986 – 1989, 1994 – 1995
ESAF 1994 – 1998
PRGF 2001 – 2005

0

0
317.31

0
159.69

0

0
266.29

South Africa

1980 – 1988**

None

0

Sudan

1983 – 2005

None

0

Swaziland

None

None

0

Tanzania

None

SAF 1987 – 1990
ESAF 1991 – 1994, 1996 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

491.09

Togo

1986
1991

SAF 1988 – 1989
ESAF 1989 – 1998

100.38

Uganda

1981 – 1991
1994 – 2005

SAF 1987 – 1989
ESAF – 1989 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

501.36

Zambia

None

ESAF 1995 – 1999
PRGF 2000 – 2005

1257.03

Zimbabwe

None

ESAF 1992 – 1995

151.90

*Total IMF assistance under the SAF, ESAF and PRGF from 1980 – 2005; 1 SDR = 1.53 USD
**Start date of conflict precedes 1980
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and total IMF assistance from 1980 – 2005. Out of these cases, nineteen countries
experienced conflict after implementing an IMF-led structural adjustment or PRGF
program. In addition, seven countries did not implement IMF programs and experienced
no conflict. The remaining eighteen countries represent cases where either conflict
occurred without any IMF programs being in place or conflict preceded the
implementation of an IMF-led program.
Measurement for all variables will begin in 1980, the earliest year data are
available in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, and continues until 2005, the
most recent year all data are available.2 Once a country experiences conflict it is dropped
from the dataset. It reenters the year peace is reestablished. Though 1980 is a limitation
imposed by availability of data, it is an acceptable start date since the height of the debt
crisis had yet to hit and it is several years prior to the implementation of the first
Structural Adjustment Facility in 1986. The model incorporates measurements on the
control variables of economic grievances, exploitable resources, regime type, social
fractionalization, population pressure, difficult geography, prior civil conflict and other
forms of conditionality. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables.

Armed Civil Conflict
In this analysis, the dependent variable of armed civil conflict is defined as a
country having a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths a year, as defined in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Oslo International Peace Research Institute (PRIO)
Armed Conflict Dataset. A dummy variable represents whether a country experienced

2

Djibouti and Namibia are two exceptions—GDP data is not available for Djibouti prior to 1987, and
Namibia did not win its independence from South Africa until 1990.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Conflict

939

0.543

0.227

0

1

IMF SAF

939

0.081

0.273

0

1

IMF ESAF

939

0.171

0.377

0

1

IMF PRGF

939

0.140

0.347

0

1

World Bank

939

0.347

0.476

0

1

HIPC

939

0.094

0.292

0

1

GDP

939

7.283

20.669

0.105

239.42

Per Capita GDP

939

960.533

1384.997

59.5

8853.7

GDP Growth

939

3.387

6.315

-27.2

106.3

939

0.611

0.197

0.03

0.85

Fractionalization
2

Fractionalization

939

0.411

0.201

0.001

0.718

Enclave

939

0.215

0.411

0

1

Regime

939

4.697

1.531

1

7

2

939

24.417

13.125

1

49

Population Density

939

67.179

98.988

1.57

614.78

Forest Cover
Topography

939
939

30.932
1.038

23.393
0.076

0.22
0.709

86.96
1.454

Prior Conflict
(Absorbing State)

939

0.475

0.500

0

1

Prior Conflict
(Proximity Log)

939

0.981

1.235

0

3.714

Regime

conflict in a given year: a measure of 1 indicates there was conflict; 0 represents the
absence of conflict. Because it is reasonable to expect that a country with a history of
conflict is more likely to experience internal violence, an additional independent control
variable will reflect whether the country experienced conflict prior to 1980.

IMF Programs
Countries often enter into standby arrangements prior to their accession to the
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
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(ESAF) or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).

These standby

arrangements are accompanied with very low levels of conditionality; therefore they are
not included in this analysis. Because of the higher levels of conditionality associated
with the SAF, ESAF and PRGF, only these three programs will be included in this model.
In the literature, scholars do not often differentiate between the SAF and ESAF. Because
these two programs differ in the level of financing and scope of conditionality, they will
be tested as two separate dummy variables.

In addition, critics argue that PRGF

programs are essentially the same as structural adjustment, despite the PRGF’s increased
focus on poverty reduction. In order to ascertain whether these criticisms hold merit,
PRGFs will also be tested separately. Therefore three dummy variables will indicate
whether each country was taking part in an IMF-led SAF, ESAF or PRGF in a given
year.

An additional variable will represent the total amount in SDRs of IMF

disbursements each year under the SAF, ESAF and PRGF.
The International Monetary Fund publishes a history of each member country’s
lending arrangements. Unfortunately, information contained on each country page is not
accurate.

Concessional lending arrangements in sub-Saharan African countries are

classified as falling under either the SAF or PRGF. None of the countries is shown to
have undergone an ESAF program, which is incorrect. Because the SAF was officially
laid to rest in 1995, and the PRGF was not created until 1999, any program falling within
this period appears to be misclassified. Several additional sources were required in order
to properly classify each country’s lending arrangements, including country documents
available on the IMF website and Boughton’s in-depth historical overview of the IMF’s
operations between 1979 and 1989 (2001).
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Because IMF programs may contribute to an increased risk for civil conflict in
many ways, an ideal analysis would include measures of the different mechanisms that
may affect conflict.

Proxies would include figures for social spending, military

expenditures, overall budget cuts, privatizations and reductions in public jobs.
Unfortunately, data for these indicators are rarely available before the early 1990s.
Because the IMF introduced structural adjustment programs in 1986, the initial effects of
these programs are not represented in the data. Due to this limitation, it is extremely
difficult to parse out the main explanatory variable into the different causal pathways.

Other Forms of Conditionality
Dummy variables represent whether a country is also participating in a program
involving other forms of conditionality. The World Bank projects database classifies
each lending project into one of two categories: “development policy lending” and
“investment” (World Bank 2007b). A country is coded as “1” if it is participating in
development policy lending in a given year, and “0” if it is not. HIPC countries are
coded in the same fashion; the data is taken from the IMF’s database of HIPC country
documents (IMF 2007b).

Economic Grievances
In this analysis I use three proxies for economic grievances. Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) indicates the overall economic condition of the country. A lagged GDP
variable is included as well to control for autocorrelation. Per capita GDP represents
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economic conditions at the individual level.3 In addition, annual percent change in GDP
reflects whether changing economic conditions impact conflict. Measurement is taken
each year, and reflects current prices of the US dollar.

The source of data is the

September 2006 World Economic Outlook Database, published by the IMF. The Gini
coefficient, which measures income inequality, would be a useful additional proxy for
economic grievance.

Unfortunately, consistent measures of the Gini coefficient are

missing for a majority of the countries in the dataset, so this variable is not included in
the model. This exclusion may be justified in that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa
arguably have high levels of income inequality.

Lootable Resources
Leonard and Strauss (2003) provide the proxy measurement for lootable
resources: enclave economies. They base their classification on the value of exports from
minerals, timber and estate agriculture as a percentage of exports. A value of at least
75% classifies the country as having an enclave economy. The authors do not provide
data for all countries, so information from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) database and the CIA World Factbook provide the data necessary to
classify the countries excluded from their analysis.

Regime Type
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Country Rankings is used to code for
regime type (2007). This framework assigns values to states, rating them on a scale of 1
3

Measures of Gross National Income may be a more suitable proxy to demonstrate foregone income
opportunities, but data were not available for many countries. Thus, GDP data will serve as an appropriate
substitute.
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to 7 for the level of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with average scores of
1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, those with scores of 3.0 to 5.0 are considered Partly Free,
and those with scores of 5.5 to 7.0 are considered Not Free. Because the predicted
relationship is curvilinear, a squared fractionalization term is included in the model.

Social Fractionalization
Annett (2001) developed an index for the measurement of ethnolinguistic and
religious fractionalization for the IMF. The author calculates fractionalization using data
from the World Christian Encyclopedia. He produces measurements for 150 countries—
a marked increase over previous indices such as the 1960 Soviet-produced index of
ethnic fractionalization, which included only 119 countries and did not account for
religious divides (Anett 2001). The fractionalization index measures the probability that
two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnolinguistic and religious
groups. Thus, a low score of 0 would represent an entirely homogeneous society, while a
high score of 100 indicates complete heterogeneity. Theory suggests that countries with
moderate scores would be more likely to experience protracted civil conflict. A squared
term is included to allow for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship.

Resource Scarcity and Population Pressures
Competition for resources is measured in terms of population density. The higher
the density, the more likely people are to compete over resources in a given state. The
World Development Indicators provide measurements on this variable.
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Difficult Geography
Difficult geography is represented by two variables. The first is forest cover,
expressed as a percentage of total land area covered by forest. The second is a proxy for
topography, and is calculated as a ratio of a country’s surface area to total land area.
Higher ratios represent greater changes in elevation, which provides an estimation of
mountainous regions in a country. All of these measurements come from the World
Development Indicators.

Prior History of Civil Conflict
Two variables account for a country’s past history of civil conflict. The first, an
absorbing state dummy, reflect whether a country has experienced any violent civil
conflict post-independence. A value of “1” reflects that the country saw at least 25
battle-related deaths in at least one year since gaining independence. The second variable
estimates the fading impact of past conflicts on a country’s likelihood of experiencing
renewed violence. It is expressed as the natural log of the number of years since the
previous conflict ended.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 3 reports the results of the model. Model fit is good: chi2 is 112535, which
far surpasses the critical value of 45.315 required to be significant at the p < .001 level
with twenty degrees of freedom. The coefficients for IMF-led structural adjustment and
PRGF programs are actually negative, the opposite of the expected direction, but neither
variable is statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility is 0.707, in the expected direction, and is significant. This indicates
that ESAF programs increase a country’s risk of experiencing civil conflict by 102.8%.
Total IMF assistance is not significant, nor are controls for other forms of conditionality
(World Bank and HIPC programs).
Both measures of the impact of prior conflict are significant in the expected
directions. The absorbing state prior conflict dummy has a coefficient of 0.738, meaning
that any post-independence conflict, regardless of when it occurred, increases the hazard
of experiencing civil conflict by 109.2%. The coefficient of the proximity of prior
conflict indicates that every one unit increase in the log of years since the prior conflict
ended results in a 25.5% decrease in the hazard rate. When the effects of these two
variables are calculated together, a country will no longer be at increased risk of renewed
violence after about thirteen years. The coefficients for overall GDP and and the lagged
GDP variable are both significant. Interestingly enough, the GDP variable indicates that
wealthier countries actually have a slightly higher risk of experiencing conflict. GDP
growth is also significant, showing that for every one percent increase in GDP growth,
the hazard rate decreases by about 7%. Both fractionalization variables are significant,
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Table 3. Predicting the Risk of Civil Conflict
Variable

Coefficients
(Standard Error)

Constant

-10.141***
(3.110)

P

Percent Change in the
Hazard Rate

0.001

-100.0%

SAF

-0.762
(0.699)

0.275

-53.4%

ESAF

0.707*
(0.418)

0.091

102.8%

PRGF

-0.304
(0.849)

0.720

-26.2%

Total IMF Assistance

-0.001
(0.002)

0.617

-0.1

World Bank Program

-0.045
(0.392)

0.909

-4.4%

HIPC Country

0.050
(0.690)

0.942

5.1%

GDP

0.099
(0.035)

0.005

10.1%

Lagged GDP

-0.105
(0.046)

0.024

Per Capita GDP

-0.0004
(0.0003)

0.162

0.0%

GDP Growth

-0.070***
(0.026)

0.008

-6.8%

Fractionalization

5.090**
(2.487)

0.041

16,139.0%

Fractionalization2

-6.188**
(2.659)

0.020

-99.8%

Enclave

0.801**
(0.415)

0.053

122.8%

Regime

2.232***
(0.803)

0.007

831.8%

Regime2

-0.239***
(0.086)

0.006

-21.3%

Population Density

0.001
(0.001)

0.352

0.1%

Forest Cover

-0.007
(0.011)

0.511

-0.7%

Topography

1.904
(2.023)

0.346

571.3%

Prior Conflict (Absorbing State)

0.738**
(0.377)

0.050

109.2%

Prior Conflict (Proximity Log)

-0.295**
(0.126)

0.019

-25.5%

112.53***

0.000

Chi2
Log Pseudolikelihood
n

-10.0

-159.00976
44

Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the following levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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indicating that the expected parabolic relationship is confirmed. Initial increases in the
fractionalization measure lead to heightened risk of civil conflict, but once the
fractionalization level reaches .41, that risk begins to decrease. Both regime variables are
also significant, indicating a similar parabolic relationship.

Once calculated, the

inflection point is 4.67, indicating that the risk begins to decrease once the Freedom
House score moves from 4.5 to 5.0. The presence of an enclave economy is also
significant, increasing the hazard rate by 118%. None of the other control variables
representing per capita GDP, population density, forest cover or topography are
significant.
These results are quite interesting because critics of IMF conditionality tend to
paint the different programs with one wide brush.

Those who do acknowledge

differences generally separate PRGF programs from structural adjustment, stating that the
former does constitute a qualitative improvement over the latter. Critics who discuss
structural adjustment programs, however, do not often differentiate between the original
Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. The
findings, however, suggest that conditionality associated with the original SAF does not
lead to increased instability, while conditions attached to the ESAF do place countries at
a higher risk of civil conflict. It is thus important to revisit the differences between the
two programs in order to determine what aspects of these programs account for these
differing impacts.
As previously mentioned, the original SAF programs focused almost entirely on
macroeconomic reform of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy. These conditions
required decreased public spending and currency devaluations that disproportionately
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affected poorer segments of the population. Heightened grievances resulting from these
initial shocks would presumably lead to increased attractiveness for insurgency.

It

appears, however, that this was not the case. The SAF variable was not significant, and
even if it had been it would indicate that the SAF is actually associated with a decreased
risk of experiencing civil conflict. It may be possible that governments had some success
in convincing their constituents that the difficult short-term consequences of adjustment
were necessary to ensure long-term economic sustainability and prosperity.
The transition to the ESAF represented a broadening in the scope of IMF
conditionality. ESAF programs relied on structural measures such as improving the tax
structure (widening the tax base), strengthening public expenditure management,
removing subsidies and privatizing state-own enterprises. By definition, these reforms
were more intrusive and were designed to hold governments more accountable for their
performance under the ESAF. It is a reasonable assertion that the conditions attached to
ESAF programs therefore dealt a major blow to patronage networks—an intended effect
of IMF conditionality. SAF programs did require overall budget cuts that undoubtedly
limited the financial resources available to patronage-based governments. These systems,
however, traditionally relied on a wide variety of patronage resources extending beyond
monetary payments.

Governments could provide jobs, favorable import quotas, tax

breaks and other concessions to their preferred clients. The implementation of SAF
programs therefore only restricted one of the major patronage resources: money. Nonmonetary patronage resources were still largely intact.
Structural conditionality associated with the ESAF, however, cut much deeper
into patronage networks. Widening the tax base meant that it would be more difficult for
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governments to give tax breaks to preferred clients. Increased focus on privatizing stateowned enterprises and streamlining the bureaucracy decreased the number of public jobs
available. Trade liberalization limited governments’ ability to reward their supporters
with concessions such as favorable import quotas.

ESAF programs thus severely

restricted patron-client systems, an intended effect of conditionality, but they also had
unintended consequences in that they apparently led to an increased risk of violent civil
conflict.
This risk decreases with the introduction of PRGF programs, perhaps because the
IMF issued new guidelines on conditionality at this time. Internal assessments have found
that under the PRGF conditionality is being used more sparingly and is more focused on
the IMF’s core area of responsibility, macroeconomic policy, rather than on structural
reforms (IEO 2005).
In order to better understand which structural reforms have the most impact on civil
conflict, an ideal analysis would incorporate measures of these conditions: privatizations,
reductions on public jobs, changes to the tax structure and other proxies. Unfortunately
these data are not available for much of the time period examined in this analysis.
Therefore it is not possible to dissect ESAF programs into the different causal pathways
in a quantitative analysis such as this. Future research in this area would benefit from indepth case studies of the impacts of structural conditionality on patronage networks.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, IMF conditionality has led to a host of problems in sub-Saharan African
countries.

Conditionality programs required policies that had particularly negative

consequences for the poor, such as currency devaluation and social spending cuts.
Decreased patronage resources limited governments’ ability to provide concessions or
side-payments to potentially restive populations. Finally, cuts in military spending may
have made states unable to quash rebellion when it did occur. All of these problems
potentially increase a country’s risk of experiencing internal conflict.
The results of this analysis support the hypothesis that IMF conditionality increases the
risk of conflict.

Structural conditions attached to the ESAF may have limited the

availability of patronage resources to such an extent that governments were no longer
able to maintain the stability of patron-client systems. Grievances increased, political
support eroded, and in many cases civil conflict ensued. SAF and PRGF programs are
not associated with the high level of invasive structural conditions found in ESAF
programs, and neither of these variables was significant. Prior conflict, negative GDP
growth, moderate levels of social fractionalization, transitional regimes and the presence
of enclave economies all significantly increase conflict risk.

Due to the lack of

quantitative data on many of the structural conditions associated with IMF programs,
future research utilizing in-depth case studies would provide a more complete
understanding of the linkages between IMF conditionality and armed civil conflict.
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